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Bootlegging, Oysters, and  
Closed-to-Harvest Waters: Adding 
Teeth to the Coastal Zone 
Management Act to More Effectively 
and Efficiently Restore the Coastal 
Zone 
Clare M. Harmon* 
INTRODUCTION 
As the impacts of climate change and the need to efficiently 
preserve and cultivate the resources of the coastal zone become 
more apparent, it becomes increasingly critical that the traditional 
uses of the coastal zone are better balanced with its current needs 
and capabilities.1  A degraded coastal zone affects a variety of 
 
*  J.D., Roger Williams University School of Law, Dec. 2016; B.A., Marine 
Biology and Sustainability, Roger Williams University, 2013.  For my parents, 
Mary Ann and Justin Harmon, for each and every time you allowed me to break 
into your bank so I could save a whale, single-handedly stop mass climate 
change, or otherwise follow my blind ambition to keep the ocean alive.  And for 
John J. Roy of The Sound School Regional Aquaculture Center, in New Haven, 
CT, for forcing me to apply to college when I was not ready and trusting me 
with the lives of thousands of black sea bass.  My personal growth that year 
came at the expense of hundreds of fish that died. I am not very sorry about 
the fish, but I am thankful for the options you ensured I had—when you knew 
I would be ready for them come graduation. 
 1.   See 16 U.S.C.A. § 1453(1) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-327) 
(defining the coastal zone to include the coastal waters of every state with a 
shoreline and the land inland from the shorelines to the extent necessary to 
control shore lands); see also BILIANA CICIN-SAIN & ROBERT W. KNECHT, THE 
FUTURE OF U.S. OCEAN POLICY: CHOICES FOR THE NEW CENTURY 263 (2000) 
(discussing the interplay between the ocean and weather conditions and 
predicted changes in connection with global warming). 
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interests and requires a comprehensive solution.2  However, those 
attempting to conserve and restore the public resources of the 
coastal zone are being bogged down by the chaotic amalgamation of 
laws necessary for permitting and licensure.  Their efforts are 
largely outpaced by the human demands of the coastal zone’s 
resources.3  This Comment will point to some of the inefficiencies of 
the current coastal restoration framework and focus on the 
intersection between coastal health and the oyster fishery; it will 
explore ways in which the coastal restoration framework may be 
improved so that those attempting to restore the coastal zone for 
the benefit of the public are not overly burdened. 
The inefficiencies of the U.S. coastal and fisheries management 
approach are well illustrated in the century-long decline of the 
oyster fishery and the associated degradation of the oyster’s coastal 
habitat.4  A century of treating oysters as an exploitable fishery 
resource and giving their management to diverse fishery agencies 
resulted in fragmented decisions about harvest controls, 
restoration, and introduction of alternative, non-commercial 
substitutes, which contributed to the national coastal conservation 
crisis.5  In response to the failed preservation of the oyster, 
scientists sought a single approach that addressed the concurrent 
goal of restoring shellfish populations and the living and non-living 
resources they affect.  The 2005 Scientific Consensus Statement set 
forth a working definition of an Ecosystem-Based Management 
Approach (EBM): 
 
 2.   See KAREN L. MCLEOD, ET AL., SCIENTIFIC CONSENSUS STATEMENT ON 
MARINE ECOSYSTEM-BASED MANAGEMENT 1 (2005), http://www.marine 
planning.org/pdf/Consensusstatement.pdf [hereinafter SCIENTIFIC CONSENSUS 
STATEMENT] (“Over half of the U.S. population lives along the coast, and more 
than $200 billion in economic activity was associated with the ocean in 2000.”).  
Of that $200 billion, the commercial fishing industry contributed over $28 
billion and the revenue. U.S. COMM. ON OCEAN POLICY, AN OCEAN BLUEPRINT 
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 31 (2004), http://www.aquariumof 
pacific.org/images/mcri_uploads/ocean_full_report.pdf [hereinafter OCEAN 
BLUEPRINT].  
 3.   OCEAN BLUEPRINT, supra note 2, at 32 (“Americans consume more 
than 4 billion pounds of seafood at home or in restaurants and cafeterias every 
year.”).  
 4.  See B.J. Rothschild et al., Decline of the Chesapeake Bay Oyster 
Population: A Century of Habitat Destruction and Overfishing, 111 MAR. ECOL. 
PROG. SER. 29 (1994). 
 5.  OCEAN BLUEPRINT, supra note 2, at 40 (“Although U.S. fishery 
management has been successful in some regions, failures elsewhere have 
resulted in substantial social and economic costs.”).  
484 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 22:482 
[A]n integrated approach to management that considers 
the entire ecosystem, including humans.  The goal of 
[EBM] is to maintain an ecosystem in a healthy, 
productive and resilient condition so that it can provide 
the services that humans want and need.  [EBM] differs 
from current approaches that usually focus on single 
species, sector, or activity or concern; it considers the 
cumulative impacts of different sectors.6 
EBM is the best management approach to address a degraded 
coastal zone because it recognizes the interconnectedness of the 
coastal zone’s components including linkages across systems and 
disciplines.  EBM should be incorporated into marine resource 
management through the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA), 
because the CZMA is the primary framework for coastal 
restoration.7  EBM offers the necessary framework for individual 
states to strike a balance among competing demands for the natural 
resources of the coastal zone.  Despite its recognition among the 
scientific community and policy recognition in coastal management 
programs, very little has been done to implement EBM in marine 
resource programs.  Coastal states could more effectively utilize the 
CZMA federal regulatory program to more efficiently restore and 
protect the coastal zone. 
The CZMA provides coastal restoration proponents the 
opportunity to cut through excessive and conflicting state 
regulation around coastal conservation and aquaculture to focus 
directly on a solution that could preserve and clean up the coastal 
zone.8  A key challenge in implementing the CZMA for coastal 
restoration purposes is the lack of a streamlined procedure for 
proponents acting for the public benefit.9  While either a new legal 
authority or an appropriate amendment to the CZMA would be 
ideal and may eventually become necessary, the CZMA allows a 
state to adopt EBM without the added hassle of creating new 
authority.10  This Comment will examine ways in which a coastal 
state could use the CZMA to more efficiently restore its coastal zone 
in light of EBM, using Rhode Island as an example.  Part I will 
 
 6.  SCIENTIFIC CONSENSUS STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 1. 
 7.  16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1451–1462 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-327). 
 8.  See id. § 1452(2)(G), (I) (Westlaw). 
 9.  See generally id. § 1455 (Westlaw). 
 10.  Id. § 1454 (Westlaw) (allowing states to submit their own coastal 
management plans to the Secretary for review and approval). 
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assess the federal coastal regulatory regime and Rhode Island’s 
program pursuant to it.  Part II will discuss the development of 
shellfish aquaculture for the purpose of increasing habitat.  And 
finally, Part III will address some regulatory inefficiencies and 
discuss possible improvements. 
I. THE COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK 
A. The Federal Coastal Zone Management Act 
“Today, people who work and live on the water . . . face a 
patchwork of confusing and sometimes contradictory 
federal and state authorities and regulations. No 
mechanism exists for establishing a common vision or set 
of objectives.”11   
 
In 1972, Congress passed the CZMA after a finding that there 
was a “national interest in the effective management, beneficial 
use, protection, and development of the coastal zone.”12  The CZMA 
is a cooperative federal regime that resembles a contract between 
the federal government and coastal states.13  The National Oceanic 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), a scientific agency within the 
Department of Commerce, holds the regulatory authority.  
Congress passed the CZMA in order to “preserve, protect, develop, 
and where possible, to restore or enhance, the resources of the 
Nation’s coastal zone.”14  Congress also wanted to encourage states 
to “exercise effectively their responsibilities in the coastal zone 
through the development and implementation of management 
programs to achieve wise use of the land and water resources of the 
coastal zone.”15  Thus, unlike other federal acts, the CZMA 
incentivizes participation, but does not punish the state for 
inaction, and provides states great discretion to prioritize their local 
interests.16 
 
 11.  S. REP. NO. 106-301 at 3 (2000). 
 12.  § 1451(a) (Westlaw). 
 13.  See John A. Duff, The Coastal Zone Management Act: Reverse Pre-
Emption or Contractual Federalism?, 6 OCEAN & COASTAL L.K. 109, 111–12 
(2001) (analogizing the CZMA to contractual agreements). 
 14.  § 1452(1) (Westlaw) (emphasis added).  
 15.  Id. § 1452(2) (Westlaw) (emphasis added). 
 16.  See Patrick J. Gibbons, Too Much of a Good Thing? Federal 
Supremacy and the Devolution of Regulatory Power: The Case of the Coastal 
Zone Management Act, 48 NAVAL L. REV. 84, 91 (2001). 
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The CZMA encourages coastal states to formulate coastal 
management plans (CMP) and to submit them to the Secretary of 
Commerce (Secretary) for approval.17  In formulating its CMP, a 
state must account for a list of program elements.18  This list 
includes, inter alia, an identification of coastal zone boundaries, an 
inventory and designation of areas of particular concern, a 
description of the organizational structure charged with 
implementing its CMP, and a complete list of the federal license 
and permit activities that affect its coastal zone that the state 
wants to review for consistency.19  In exchange for participation, a 
coastal state receives federal funding and cooperation in 
effectuating its CMP and retains veto power for land uses that are 
inconsistent with its CMP.20 
Once the Secretary approves a state’s CMP, federal agency 
activities and private party projects affecting the coastal zone must 
be consistent with that CMP.21  Federal agency activities must be 
consistent to the maximum extent practicable with the state’s 
CMP.22  The federal agency that is managing the activity makes 
the consistency determination for the relevant state agency.23  The 
state then approves or rejects the determination.24  For all other 
activities, the state conducts the consistency determination 
according to its CMP.25  Applications for federal permits must 
ensure that the activity corresponds with the state’s CMP.26  If the 
state objects to a permit, it will not be issued unless the Secretary 
overrides the objection.27  If the state does object, the agency may 
pursue judicial intervention to enjoin the activity or mediation with 
the Secretary.28 
 
 17.  § 1454 (Westlaw). 
 18.  Id. § 1455(d)(1)–(2) (Westlaw). 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  To receive approval under the statute, a state’s CMP must manifest a 
series of program elements that include: defining the coastal zone, establishing 
permissible land and water uses, and describing the way in which the state 
intends to enforce control.  See id. § 1456 (Westlaw). 
 21.  Id. § 1456(c) (Westlaw). 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. § 1456(c)(1)(C) (Westlaw). 
 24.  Id.; see also 15 C.F.R. § 930.1 (2014).  
 25.  § 1456(c)(3)(A)–(d) (Westlaw). 
 26.  Id. § 1456 (c)(2) (Westlaw).  
 27.  Id. § 1456(c)(3)(A) (Westlaw). 
 28.  15 C.F.R. § 930.35(e) (2014). 
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B. Rhode Island’s Coastal Zone Management Program 
The Rhode Island General Assembly formulated the Rhode 
Island Coastal Resources Management Council (CRMC) in 1971—
a year prior to federal enactment of the CZMA—to effectuate its 
duties in the coastal zone.29  The Federal Office of Coastal 
Management approved Rhode Island’s first regulatory program 
integrating federal approval criteria in 1977, qualifying the state 
for $1.2 million annually in implementation funds.30 
The Rhode Island Ocean Special Area Management Plan 
(Ocean SAMP) serves as the state CMP for CZMA purposes.31  The 
Ocean SAMP establishes state policies to serve as criteria for 
granting or denying permits, but these are unenforceable.32  The 
Rhode Island General Assembly requires the CRMC to “where 
possible, restore the coastal resources of the state . . . through 
comprehensive and coordinated long range planning and 
management designed to produce the maximum benefit for society 
from these coastal resources.”33  Rhode Island’s CRMC is required 
to use the preservation and restoration of ecosystems as primary 
guidance principles when considering alteration of coastal 
resources.34  Rhode Island’s Ocean SAMP is a milestone recognized 
by President Obama’s Ocean Policy Task Force as a national model 
for marine spatial planning.35  The Ocean SAMP is expected to 
“promot[e] a balanced and comprehensive [EBM] approach to 
development and protection of Rhode Island’s ocean resources.”36  
The Ocean SAMP cites, incorporates, encourages, and enforces the 
Scientific Consensus on Marine Ecosystem-Based Management in 
 
 29.  § 1456 (Westlaw); 46 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 46-23-6(1)(i) (West, Westlaw 
through 2016 Legis. Sess.). 
 30.  R.I. COASTAL RES. MGMT. COUNCIL, RHODE ISLAND COASTAL RESOURCES 
MANAGEMENT COUNCIL: OVER 30 YEARS OF ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN COASTAL 
MANAGEMENT 6 (2005), http://www.library.state.ri.us/publications 
/CRMC/CRMC_30YearsBW.pdf. 
 31.   R.I. COASTAL RES. MGMT. COUNCIL, UNIV. OF R.I., THE 
OCEAN/OFFSHORE RENEWABLE ENERGY SPECIAL AREA MANAGEMENT PLAN 1 
(2008). 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  46 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 46-23-1(a)(2) (West, Westlaw through 2016 Legis. 
Sess.). 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Letter from Michael M. Tikoian, Chairman, R.I. Coastal Resources 
Management Council (Oct. 19, 2010), www.crmc.ri.gov/samp_ocean/final 
approved/0_TikoianIntroLetter.pdf. 
 36.  Id. 
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its management of the coastal zone.  The Ocean SAMP identifies 
four goals to balance coastal development with the protection of its 
marine resources: 
1.  Foster a properly functioning ecosystem that is both 
ecologically and economically beneficial. 
2.  Promote and enhance existing uses. 
3. Encourage marine-based economic development that 
considers aspirations of local communities and is 
consistent with and complimentary to the state’s overall 
economic development, social, and environmental needs 
and goals. 
4. Build a framework for coordinated decision-making 
between state and federal management agencies.37 
It is quite fitting that the Ocean State has such a 
comprehensive CMP.  Nevertheless, even the front runner has room 
to improve as the problem with shellfish restoration discussed 
below illustrates. 
II. RESTORATION AQUACULTURE:  AN EBM METHOD 
“We forget that the water cycle and the life cycle are one.” 
– Jacques Cousteau 
 
This Comment focuses on the framework applicable to a 
hypothetical coastal shellfish habitat restoration project to bolster 
ecosystem health that incorporates aquaculture for public benefit 
within the State of Rhode Island.38  A secondary and indirect 
objective of this project and other projects of this kind is often to 
increase species abundance to potentially improve the fishery.  This 
hypothetical project involves the laying of oyster shell along the 
ocean bottom to increase substrate for other species to colonize.  The 
laying of shell, while minimally invasive, is considered “fill” and 
qualifies as aquaculture for permitting purposes.39 
 
 37.  R.I. ADMIN. CODE 16-1-17:130.4(a)–(d) (West, Westlaw through Feb. 
2017 amendments). 
 38.  Though this Comment limits itself to the confines of Rhode Island, this 
is a problem shared by all of the coastal states, and none of the coastal states 
forbid such projects by its laws. 
 39.   Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1344 (Westlaw 
through Pub. L. No. 114-327).  A “dredge and fill” permit is required from the 
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A.  The Benefits of Shellfish Restoration 
The proposed introduction of oyster into the coast is an EBM 
approach to coastal restoration and fisheries management.  Such 
projects are becoming increasingly common in the United States, 
catalyzed by the public’s increased awareness of oyster’s important 
ecological role in coastal waters as well as by the fact that they are 
relatively budget-friendly compared to alternatives.  The American 
Oyster (Oyster), Crassostrea virginica, is a keystone species with 
an unparalleled ability to restore ecosystem integrity.40  Oysters 
are nicknamed “ecosystem engineers” because of the multiple roles 
they play, including inter alia: (1) improving water clarity by 
filtering large volumes of water per day; (2) improving water 
quality by removing nitrogen; (3) increasing the three-dimensional 
complexity of the ocean bottom, thereby serving as a habitat for 
other species; and (4) protecting shorelines from erosion.41 
Shellfish restoration is a powerful way to restore the integrity 
and resilience of ecosystems.42  Given the variety of species 
associated with three-dimensional structures formed from the 
vertical filling of oyster cultch, as well as the complex interactions 
that occur between the species, the NOAA, National Fish and 
 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers for most dredging aquaculture activities within 
the coastal zone. Id.  Aquaculture is defined as “the breeding, rearing, and 
harvesting of fish, shellfish, plants, algae and other organisms in all types of 
water environments.” What is aquaculture?, NOAA, http:// 
oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/aquaculture.html (last updated Mar. 28, 2016).  
 40.   See COMM. ON NONNATIVE OYSTERS IN THE CHESAPEAKE BAY, NAT’L 
RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., NONNATIVE OYSTERS IN THE 
CHESAPEAKE BAY 323 (2004); see also Juliana M. Harding, Observations on the 
Early Life History and Growth Rates of Juvenile Channel Whelks Busycotypus 
canaliculatus (Linnaeus, 1758), 30 J. OF SHELLFISH RES. 901, 901–03 (2011) 
(suggesting that oyster reefs may provide a higher diversity and availability of 
food or a greater amount of higher quality food compared to other marine 
habitats); Jonathan H. Grabowski & Charles H. Peterson, Restoring Oyster 
Reefs to Recover Ecosystem Services, in ECOSYSTEM ENGINEERS:  PLANTS TO 
PROTISTS 281–83 (2007). 
 41.   DOROTHY LEONARD & SANDRA MACFARLANE, BEST MANAGEMENT 
PRACTICES FOR SHELLFISH RESTORATION: PREPARED FOR THE ISSC SHELLFISH 
RESTORATION COMMITTEE 4 (2011), http://www.ecsga.org/Pages/Sustainability/ 
ShellfishRestorationBMPs.pdf (presented at the joint meeting of the Northeast 
Aquaculture Conference on Shellfish Restoration). 
 42.   See e.g., Jamie Coelho, How Roger Williams is Saving Our Wild 
Oysters, RHODE ISLAND MONTHLY, http://www.rimonthly.com/Rhode-Island-
Monthly/December-2015/How-Roger-Williams-is-Saving-Our-Wild-Oysters/ 
(last visited Mar. 20, 2017).  
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Wildlife Foundation, and the Environmental Protection Agency 
recognize shellfish habitats as priority habitats; these habitats are 
considered an “essential fish habitat.”43  Studies show that merely 
laying a couple of inches of oyster shells along the ocean bottom has 
drastic benefits for ecosystem health because the vertical lift 
differential allows species to form habitats higher up in the water 
column where dissolved oxygen levels are more concentrated and 
conducive to life.44  The ecological services the oyster provides have 
been estimated to provide an economic value between $5,500 and 
$99,000 per hectare per year.45  The more oysters there are in an 
ecosystem, the healthier the water is.  The healthier the water, the 
healthier the oyster. The healthier the oyster, the healthier its 
population and dependent species become. 
1.   The Problem with Shellfish Restoration:  Restoration in 
Closed-to-Harvest Waters 
The physical introduction of oysters poses a unique problem for 
coastal restoration proponents and, consequently, restoration is 
rarely undertaken in the waters that need it most.  The best 
restoration sites for a project of this kind are most often locations 
where oysters once flourished—old commercial harvest sites that 
are now too polluted to rear food for human consumption.46  These 
waters are the most degraded, and they are not certified for 
commercial harvest.47  Of the 33,000 square miles of shellfish 
 
 43.   See id.  Oyster reefs have been considered an “essential fish habitat” 
for resident and transient species.  However, because transient generalist 
species solely rely on oysters for habitat, it is not considered an “essential fish 
habitat” or a “critical habitat” warranting MSA and/or ESA protections.  See 
16 U.S.C.A. § 1533(a)(3) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-327).  A “critical 
habitat” is an area “essential to the conservation of the species.”  Id. § 
1532(5)(A)(i) (Westlaw); but see id. § 1802(10) (Westlaw) (An “essential fish 
habitat” is defined as “those waters and substrate necessary to fish for 
spawning, breeding, feeding or growth to maturity.”). 
 44.   See ROBERT D. BRUMBAUGH ET AL., THE NATURE CONSERVANCY, A 
PRACTITIONERS GUIDE TO THE DESIGN & MONITORING OF SHELLFISH 
RESTORATION PROJECTS 7, 8 (2006). 
 45.   See Jonathan H. Grabowski et al., Economic Valuation of Ecosystem 
Services Provided by Oyster Reefs, 62 BIOSCIENCE 900, 900 (2012), 
http://www.northeastern.edu/grabowskilab/wpcontent/uploads/2012/04/Grabo
wski-et-al-2012-BioScience_oyster-valuation.pdf.  
 46.  See LEONARD & MACFARLANE, supra note 41, at 4; see also Coelho, 
supra note 42 (discussing the effects of the “attractive nuisance” created by 
restoration projects in these areas). 
 47.   LEONARD & MACFARLANE, supra note 41, at 8. 
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growing water within the United States, just over 10,000 square 
miles are restricted.48  The volume of water being classified and 
having harvest restrictions has increased through the years.49  The 
primary objection to shellfish habitat restoration is the fear that 
their physical reintroduction, given their commercial and 
recreational value, will create an “attractive nuisance”50 for 
bootleggers to harvest in uncertified waters.51  Contaminated 
shellfish on the market would pose both health and economic 
risks.52  While there are methods to reduce the risk, they come with 
a heavy price that most proponents are ill-equipped to bear and 
thus reluctance remains to conduct restoration projects in these 
locations.53  Moreover, state law and local regulations do little to 
deter bootlegging.  An individual who harvests shellfish in these 
locations may be guilty of a misdemeanor.54  But to many, a 
misdemeanor or a fine is one cost of doing business.55  A bootlegger’s 
 
 48.  See CHARLES ALEXANDER, NOAA, CLASSIFIED SHELLFISH GROWING 
WATERS (1998), http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/websites/retiredsites/sotc_pdf 
/SGW.PDF.  
 49.   See LEONARD & MACFARLANE, supra note 41, at 8 (citing an Office of 
Ocean Resources Conservation and Assessment done by the ISSC in 2006).  
The Assessment found that in 2005, just under 10 million acres had harvest 
limitations in some capacity as compared to about 7 million acres in 1995.  Id.   
 50.   The “attractive nuisance” that proponents are referring to is a legal 
tort law doctrine in which a landowner may be held liable for injuries to 
children who trespass on land if the injury resulted from a hazardous object or 
condition on the land that is likely to attract children who are unable to 
appreciate the risk posed by the object or condition.  Though this age-old 
principle refers to children, the nuisance presented here attracts adults who 
are well seasoned on the threats of stealing these oysters.  See Maryland 
Officials just don’t get it: taking away the license of waterman who poached is 
silly—he doesn’t need a license!, THE CHESAPEAKE TODAY (July 1, 2014), 
http://www.the-chesapeake.com/2014/07/01/maryland-officials-just-dont-get-
taking-away-license-waterman-poached-silly-doesnt-need-license/ 
[hereinafter Maryland Officials just don’t get it] (discussing a recent case 
decision and why the determination is moot).  This being said, because 
attractive nuisances have historically been viewed as a land based issue and 
addressed by land use principles, I too focus my solution on the predominant 
land based coastal regime, the CZMA. 
 51.   LEONARD & MACFARLANE, supra note 41, at 4; Coelho, supra note 42.  
 52.   LEONARD & MACFARLANE, supra note 41, at 4. 
 53.   Id.  
 54.   20 R.I. GEN LAWS § 20-1-16 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Legis. 
Sess.). 
 55.   See Maryland Officials just don’t get it, supra note 50; Cynthia J. 
Bashore et al., Analysis of Marine Police Citations and Judicial Decisions for 
Illegal Harvesting of Eastern Oysters (Crassostrea Virginica, Gmelin 1791) in 
the Maryland Portion of the Chesapeake Bay, United States, from 1959 to 2010, 
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self-help decision to break the law outweighs the risk of being 
caught.56  Ironically, many bootleggers who are robbing the coastal 
projects are also shell fishermen who would personally reap the 
economic benefits of successful habitat restoration.57  But the 
consequences of bootlegging ripple beyond the edges of the coastal 
zone.58  Any potential coastal habitat restoration project must 
address this impediment that results from bootlegging, as neither 
the National Shellfish Sanitation Program (NSSP), the CZMA, nor 
state law provides the answer.59 
Many proponents feel that efforts may be better placed in 
upgrading the healthier areas than working in the prohibited 
areas.60  As a consequence, habitat restoration efforts are largely 
conducted in water already healthy enough to rear our food, but not 
in the waters that need it most.61  If the objective of almost all 
restoration projects is to “clean up” the quality of water in some 
respect, then restoration should be conducted in water that is too 
 
31 J. OF SHELLFISH RES. 591, 596 (2012) (finding that there is a positive 
correlation between years of low oyster harvests and citations for illegal 
harvests and citing a 2008 study where 43% of bootleggers held a valid fishing 
license). 
 56.   See Bashore et al., supra note 55, at 596 (describing the various 
motivations for illegal harvesting and the state of Maryland’s attempts to 
correct the economic imbalance between the cost of getting caught and the 
potential economic benefit of harvesting the resource).  Moreover, ensuring 
environmental enforcement is complex.  Decisions whether to break the law in 
the context of criminal enforcement largely turn on a calculus of four factors: 
(1) the benefit of noncompliance weighed against the chance of apprehension; 
(2) the likelihood of conviction; (3) the judicial and administrative processes 
that convert observed noncompliance into a legal judgement against the 
offender; and (4) the sanctions that are significant enough to achieve the rules 
objective. See Gary Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 
J. OF POL. ECON. 169 (1968).  Though there is little documentation on 
bootlegging in Rhode Island, this is likely because proponents, too, see that the 
benefit of breaking the law largely outweighs the other factors.  This is 
illustrated in other locations, such as the Chesapeake Bay where restoration 
aquaculture is more common. 
 57.   The NSSP despite being a voluntary nationwide program depends 
upon and directly involves the cooperation between shellfish shipping states, 
the FDA, and the shellfish industry to ensure that shellfish in interstate 
commerce are safe for public consumption.  
 58.   See Joyce R. Lombardi, Modern Oyster Wars: Off the Water and into 
Court, 47 MD. B.J. 50, 53 (2014) (discussing the negative impact bootlegging 
has had on many facets of society, particularly the courts, in the Chesapeake 
area).  
 59.   Maryland Officials just don’t get it, supra note 50.  
 60.   LEONARD & MACFARLANE, supra note 41, at 36. 
 61.   Id. 
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polluted to rear food for human consumption.62  Drawing attention 
to bodies of water compromised to that degree would encourage the 
community to identify and clean up sources of pollution.  While 
restoration in some form is conducted in these more polluted 
locations, the placement of these projects is erratic and their 
performance inconsistent.  Regulators should make every effort to 
incentivize action in these locations in order to improve their 
classification and to more appropriately value ecosystem services to 
better deter and enforce bootlegging. 
2. The Rhode Island Shellfish Industry 
What once was a historic hotbed for growing shellfish 
supporting the state’s primary fishery in the early 1900s is now no 
longer.63  The Rhode Island wild harvest is nearly zero naturally 
occurring oysters as they are now considered an “endangered 
species.”64  This decline is attributable primarily to the degradation 
of habitat, water quality, harvest pressure, and disease.65  Oyster 
 
 62.   There are many reasons why restoration should be conducted in these 
locations.  First, closed-to-harvest locations serve as a de-facto sanctuary. See 
id.; Jason Patlis et al., The National Marine Sanctuary System: The Once and 
Future Promise of Comprehensive Ocean Governance, 44 ENVTL. L. REP. 10932, 
10934 (2014) (citing a study that shows that marine reserves achieve greater 
population density and species diversity in as little as one year).  The limited 
harvest in its very nature reduces fishing pressure, which allows for shellfish 
populations to increase.  This, however, is conditioned on the sustained health 
of oyster habitat—necessary for juvenile shellfish to accumulate and grow.  It 
is impractical to assume that proponents would be successful in attaining 
sanctuary designations for these locations.  See Jason Patlis et al., The 
National Marine Sanctuary System: The Once and Future Promise of 
Comprehensive Ocean Governance, 44 ENVTL. L. REP. 10932, 10936–39 (2014).  
The process is lengthy and involves extensive stakeholder involvement. See id.  
No sanctuaries have been designated since 2000.  Id. at 10939. 
 63.   See SARAH SHUMAN, RHODE ISLAND SHELLFISH HERITAGE: AN 
ECOLOGICAL HISTORY, 12 (2015), http://shellfishheritage.seagrant.gso.uri.edu 
/RI_Shellfish_Heritage_complete.  The oyster was once at home in Rhode 
Island, as Rhode Island’s hardy and rocky bottom shoreline provided the 
species ideal conditions for its proliferation.  Id.  In the early 1990s the oyster 
industry produced 1.3 million bushels of oyster a year. Id.  But with the onset 
of pollution and the Hurricane of 1938, the fate of the oyster’s natural 
population was seemingly sealed.  Id.  
 64.   COASTAL RES. CTR., RHODE ISLAND SHELLFISH MANAGEMENT PLAN 156 
(2014); Coelho, supra note 42. 
 65.   JOSEPH T. DEALTERIS ET AL., NARRAGANSETT BAY SUMMIT 2000, WHITE 
PAPER: FISHERIES OF RHODE ISLAND 8, 39 (2000), http://nbep.org/ 
publications/other/water-quality2009/NBEP%20Bay%20Summit%20%20 
fisheries.pdf.   
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restoration efforts have only been conducted in spawner 
sanctuaries and coastal ponds.66  The restoration project that 
served as the one exception to the stipulation against restoration in 
closed waters, the Roger Williams University Oyster Gardening for 
Restoration and Enhancement (RWU-OGRE) program—“piggy-
backed” its permitting off a previously authorized emergency 
restoration activity.67  And though the cost-to-ecosystem benefit 
analysis of the RWU-OGRE restoration project has been critiqued, 
even the critics support the continuation of such projects and 
recognize the potential the state has to maximize ecosystem 
services through further research and implementation.68  And 
fifteen years of research leads Rhode Island’s leading scientists to 
believe that “self-sustaining populations may never be realized 
within the current framework of oyster restoration within Rhode 
Island.”69  A change is needed in coastal and fisheries management 
to encourage continued restoration efforts; there currently is no 
organized planning to evaluate and oversee shellfish restoration70 
It is important to note, however, that the RWU-OGRE program 
is distinguishable from the hypothetical discussed in this Comment 
for a variety of reasons.  RWU-OGRE involved the relay and 
depuration of oysters to increase oyster spawning stock biomass.71  
The RWU-OGRE program was primarily conducted in approved 
waters—with oysters being relayed from only a few privately leased 
plots in closed-to-harvest or unassessed waters to approved waters 
to depuriate before they reach a harvestable size.72  The project also 
 
 66.   COASTAL RES. CTR., supra note 64, at 156. 
 67.   COASTAL RES. CTR., supra note 64, at 219 (noting that restoration 
projects implemented as a result of an oil spill in Block Island Sound in 1966 
have been adopted and continued by other restoration efforts).  These projects 
have since been discontinued due to funding restraints. Interview with Dale 
Leavitt, Assoc. Professor of Biology, Roger Williams University, in Bristol, R.I. 
(Aug. 2016). 
 68.   Matthew Griffin, Fifteen Years of Rhode Island Oyster Restoration: A 
Performance Evaluation and Cost-Benefit Analysis 44 (2016) (unpublished 
thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
 
 
Master of Science in Ecology and Ecosystem Science) (on file with the 
University of Rhode Island), http://digitalcommons.uri.edu/cgi/viewcontent. 
cgi?article=1550&context=oa_diss.  
 69.   Id. at 45. 
 70.   COASTAL RES. CTR., supra note 64, at 129.  
 71.   Id. at 2. 
 72.   Id. at 222; see also Griffin, supra note 68, at 44. 
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involved a mix of techniques and variables that are beyond the 
scope of this Comment.  Though distinct, the grievances associated 
with the “attractive nuisance” aspect of the state approach to 
restoration is shared.  Matthew Griffin, an RWU-OGRE participant 
who recently wrote his dissertation on oyster restoration within 
Rhode Island, notes that while “admirable,” the attractive nuisance 
aspect of the state approach has the practical effect of blocking the 
implementation of restoration in locations with more appropriate 
conditions than those not conducted in the closed-to-harvest 
waters.73 
B. Responsible Agencies 
Rhode Island’s CRMC and the Department of Environmental 
Management (DEM) are the agencies that oversee shellfish-habitat 
restoration.74  The CRMC is the lead agency for coastal issues: it 
develops and implements Rhode Island’s coastal area and special 
area management plans, handles CZMA consistency reviews, and 
issues permits and leases for shellfish aquaculture.75  The DEM is 
the lead agency for fisheries management and shellfish 
 
 73.   Griffin, supra note 68, at 44 (noting that the attractive nuisance 
aspect of the approach is preventing restoration in sites with more appropriate 
salinity regimes or known and reliable recruitment of oysters). 
 74.   20 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 20-1-2 (Supp. 2016); § 20-8.1-5 (West, Westlaw 
through 2016 Legis. Sess.); § 46-23-1(b)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2016 Legis. 
Sess.).  In Alabama, the Department of Conservation and Natural Resources 
and the DEM are the lead agencies for the state’s coastal and fisheries 
programs.  ALA. CODE §§ 9-2-2, 9-7-16 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Legis. 
Sess.).  In California, the Coastal Commission is the lead agency for the state’s 
coastal programs and the Department of Fish and Wildlife life is the lead 
agency for fisheries and aquaculture.  CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 30330, 30411 
(West, Westlaw current with all 2016 Reg. Sess. laws). 
 75.  46 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 46-23-6(1)-(4) (Supp. 2016).  While Rhode Island 
has a single centralized agency at the state level that administers the entire 
coastal program, other states, such as Washington, engage in partnerships 
with local and county government to implement their coastal programs.  See 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.58.050 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. and 
Spec. Sess.).  Rhode Island has eight Ocean SAMPs to address the different 
regional issues.  Special Area Management Plans, R.I. COASTAL RES. MGMT. 
COUNCIL, www.crmc.ri.gov/samps.html (last modified Feb. 8, 2017) (stating 
that the eight SAMPs are Metro Bay, Greenwich Bay, Aquidneck Island West 
Side, Narrow River, Salt Ponds Region, Pawcatuck River, Ocean, and 
Shoreline Change (Beach)).  The Ocean SAMPs are the same as CMPs.  These 
plans are “ecosystem-based management strategies” that are allegedly 
consistent with the CRMC’s “mandate to preserve and restore ecological 
systems.”  Id. 
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sanitization: it protects, manages, and restores the state wildlife 
and fish resources and also identifies polluted shellfish grounds for 
NSSP purposes.76  The State of Rhode Island is a member of the 
Interstate Shellfish Sanitation Conference (ISSC).77  DEM and the 
Department of Health are the agencies responsible for shellfish 
sanitation.78  Currently fourteen percent of the growing waters 
have harvest limitations.79  While the Rhode Island Shellfish 
Management Plan says restoration in closed waters is prohibited,80 
no state law expressly provides so,81 and exceptions have been 
 
 76.  20 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 20-1-2 (Supp. 2016); see also § 20-8.1-5 (West, 
Westlaw through 2016 Legis. Sess.). 
 77.  List of Members, INTERSTATE SHELLFISH SANITATION CONFERENCE, 
http://www.issc.org/r (last visited Mar. 30, 2017).  The ISSC was formed to 
foster and promote shellfish sanitation through the cooperation of federal and 
state agencies, the shellfish industry, and various other stakeholders. COASTAL 
RES. CTR., supra note 64, at 222.  The ISSC sets the regulations for inter alia 
harvest-area classifications and the harvesting, processing and sale of oysters. 
Id.  It adopts uniform procedures that are incorporated into the NSSP in its 
Model Ordinance. Id. at 250.  The Model Ordinance is mainly concerned with 
consumer health and interstate shipment.  Id. at 265. 
 78.  20 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 20-8.1-5 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Legis. 
Sess.).  In Alabama, the Department of Public Health is responsible for 
shellfish sanitation. ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 420-3-18-.03(13)-(14), -.04 to -.05 
(2016).  Similarly, in California, the Department of Health Services is 
responsible for shellfish sanitation. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 112155(i)-
(j), 112160-80 (West, Westlaw current with all 2016 Reg. Sess. laws).  
 79.  C.E. Alexander, Classified Shellfish Growing Waters, in NATIONAL 
OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION (NOAA), STATE OF THE COAST 
REPORT (1998), http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/websites/retiredsites/sotc_pdf 
/SGW.PDF.  In contrast, 100% of Alabama’s growing waters have harvest 
limitations, and 96% of California’s growing waters have harvest limitations. 
Id.; cf. Jeff Mercer, Principal Biologist, R.I. Dep’t of Envtl. Mgmt., Following 
the Quahog Through Time and Space, Address at the University of Rhode 
Island Annual Ronald C. Baird Sea Grant Science Symposium (Nov. 14, 2013) 
(suggesting that Closed Areas may contribute as much as half the effective 
reproductive potential of the Narragansett Bay). 
 80.  COASTAL RES. CTR., supra note 64, at 222. 
 81.  See id. (explaining that Rhode Island has some statutes in place for 
oyster restoration projects, but those statutes are applied inconsistently); see 
also 20 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 20-2-44 (Supp. 2016) (requiring the division of fish 
and wildlife to develop a sustainable shellfish management plan); § 20-2-45(2) 
(authorizing the DEM to solicit federal funding for oyster restoration);  
§ 20-3-4 (permitting the DEM, upon recommendation from the CRMC, to 
designate certain portions of the shores and fisheries as “shell fish or marine 
life project management areas” for purposes of, among other things, “managing 
the harvest of marine species”); § 20-9-1 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Legis. 
Sess.) (authorizing the director of the DEM to perform “acts that may be 
necessary to the conduct and establishment of cooperative wildlife restoration 
projects”).  Likewise, neither Alabama nor California expressly prohibits 
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made.82 
C. Property Ownership and the Public Trust Doctrine 
The State of Rhode Island claims title to coastal waters and 
submerged lands from the mean high water mark (HWM)83 to three 
nautical miles offshore;84 its coastal zone includes this state-owned 
water and its adjacent land.85  This land is held for the public in 
trust under the state constitution, which preserves the public rights 
“including but not limited to fishing from the shore, the gathering 
of seaweed, leaving the shore to swim in the sea and passage along 
the shore . . . .”86  The Rhode Island Special Area Management Plan 
 
restoration in closed waters.  MISSISSIPPI-ALABAMA SEA GRANT LEGAL PROGRAM, 
INVENTORY OF SHELLFISH RESTORATION PERMITTING AND PROGRAMS IN THE 
COASTAL STATES 10, 17 (2014), http://masglp.olemiss. edu/projects/files/tnc-
report.pdf. 
 82.   COASTAL RES. CTR., supra note 64, at 222 (“The restoration program 
under RWU is the one exception to this stipulation, with some of the sites 
located within closed and un-assayed waters.”). 
 83.  The HWM is the average height of all the high tides at a particular 
place measured over an 18.6-year period.  State v. Ibbison, 448 A.2d 728, 730 
(R.I. 1982). 
 84.  42 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-1-1(c) (West, Westlaw through 2016 Legis. 
Sess.).  In Alabama, most tidal waters below the mean high tide line are held 
in trust by the state and managed for the public benefit and in compliance with 
state law.  ALA. CODE §§ 9-12-20, 9-15-55(a) (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. 
Sess.).  In California, the state owns tidelands, submerged lands, and beds of 
navigable waterways below the ordinary HWM of tidal waterways and below 
ordinary low water mark of non-tidal waterways.  See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 670, 
830 (West, Westlaw 2016 Reg. Sess.). 
 85.  46 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 46-6.1-4(2) (West, Westlaw through 2016 Legis. 
Sess.).  Alabama’s coastal zone is as convoluted as its geographic boundary.  
See ALA. CONST. art. II, § 37 (West, Westlaw through Mar. 2016 amendments); 
ALA. CODE § 9-7-10(1) (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.) (defining 
Alabama’s coastal zone as the “area [that] extends seaward to the outer limit 
of the United States territorial sea and extends inland from the shorelines only 
to the extent necessary to control shorelands, the uses of which have a direct 
and significant impact on the coastal waters”).  In contrast, California’s coastal 
zone is defined broadly as the land and water area “extending seaward to the 
state’s outer limit of jurisdiction, including all offshore islands, and extending 
inland generally 1,000 yards from the mean high tide line of the sea”).  CAL. 
PUB. RES. CODE § 30103(a) (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.). 
 86.  See R.I. CONST. art. I, § 17 (calling for balancing of public access to 
fishery resources with protection of natural environment); 20 R.I. GEN. LAWS 
§ 20-1-1 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Legis. Sess.) (calling for use of 
management techniques to “develop[], preserve[], and maintain[] . . . the 
beauty and mystery that wild animals bring to our environment”); Riley v. 
Dep’t of Envtl. Mgmt., 941 A.2d 198, 208 (R.I. 2008) (holding that the public 
trust right is a qualified right and is subject to the General Assembly’s duty to 
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defines public trust resources as the “tangible physical, biological 
matter substance or system, habitat or ecosystems contained on, in 
or beneath the tidal waters of the state.”87  Rhode Island’s “free and 
common” fishery is limited by its constitutional requirement that 
the public waters must be managed in such a manner as to preserve 
and protect the natural resources of the environment of the state.88 
D. Aquaculture as Applied to Cultch 
Generally speaking, Rhode Island believes that it is within the 
best interest of the people “to provide for the conservation of water, 
plant, and animal resources” through aquaculture.89  The CRMC 
and DEM90 are responsible for the necessary permitting.91  
Aquaculture has “one-stop” permitting with the lead agency and its 
own Aquaculture Coordinator.92  Aquaculture is even recognized as 
a form of agriculture for tax purposes.  Aquaculture activities must 
 
preserve, regenerate, and conserve resources); see also Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. 
Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 434 (Cal. 1983) (recognizing commerce, 
navigation, fisheries, ecological habitat protection, water oriented recreation, 
and preservation of land in its natural condition as public trust rights in 
California); see also Greater Providence Chamber of Commerce v. State, 657 
A.2d 1038, 1041 (R.I. 1995). 
 87.  R.I. COASTAL RES. MGMT. COUNCIL, RHODE ISLAND OCEAN SPECIAL 
AREA MANAGEMENT PLAN ch. 1, p.13 (2010) [hereinafter SPECIAL AREA 
MANAGEMENT PLAN].  
 88.  R.I. CONST. ART. 1, § 17 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Legis. Sess.) 
(“[I]t shall be the duty of the general assembly to provide for the conservation 
of the air, land, water, plant, animal, mineral, and other natural resources of 
the state, and to adopt all means necessary and proper by law to protect the 
natural environment of the people of the state by providing adequate resource 
planning for the control and regulation of the use of the natural resources of 
the state and for the preservation, regeneration and restoration of the natural 
environment of the state.”) (emphasis added). 
 89.  See 20 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 20-10-1 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Legis. 
Sess.); § 20-10-2 (defining aquaculture as “the cultivation, rearing, or 
propagation of aquatic plants or animals under either natural or artificial 
conditions”). 
 90.  Alabama adopted a shellfish aquaculture easement program in 2014. 
But this may have limited application to restoration work.  See ALA. ADMIN. 
CODE R. 220-4-.17 (2016). 
 91.  20 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 20-10-3; see also ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 420-3-18-.06 
(2016) (providing that bootleggers are subject to a $500 fine and, if the violation 
is continuous, he “shall be punished accordingly); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 
§ 112240 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.) (providing that a bootlegger 
is guilty of a misdemeanor, and subject to a fine between $100 and $500). 
 92.  R.I. Coastal Res. Mgmt. Council, Aquaculture and You—Frequently 
Asked Questions, RI.GOV, http://www.crmc.ri.gov/aquaculture/aquaculture 
faq.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2017). 
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adhere to the same water quality based closures and prohibitions 
as wild harvesters.93  The process of obtaining an aquaculture lease 
is essentially a public review process led by the CRMC. 
III.  ADDRESSING REGULATORY INADEQUACIES 
A coastal state could more efficiently manage its coastal zone 
by aggressively using its CZMA powers.  First, a coastal state must 
maximize its substantive breadth by incorporating EBM into its 
CMP.  EBM provides a better valuation system for ecosystem 
services than “current management approaches to fisheries, water 
quality, [and] coastal [management] . . . that are basically focused 
on a single service or small set of services, not an interlocking set.”94  
If a coastal state incorporates EBM, then EBM issues such as 
coastal restoration utilizing shellfish to increase ecosystem 
services, will be addressed as well.  Rhode Island’s CMP is 
exemplary in this respect.  The Ocean SAMP is very broad and 
incorporates EBM,95 allowing it to potentially challenge and direct 
activities in its coastal zone through its consistency program.  While 
there is a looming fear of litigation challenging a state’s expansive 
management—if the state covers its bases by having 
comprehensive regulations and policies and enveloping them in 
public doctrinal language—challenges of this kind should not be an 
issue.96   Rhode Island’s CMP could be improved, however, if its 
governance structure did more than merely recognize the linkage 
between the commercial and recreational fishing industry and 
restoration.  The Ocean SAMP recognizes that this issue needs 
redress but there is no mechanism to hold the CRMC accountable.97  
Moreover, Rhode Island’s Ocean SAMP must be cross-sectorial and 
must address human activity that may impact coastal and ocean 
resources—the Ocean SAMP does not mention anything about 
bootlegging and natural resource robbery.  Rhode Island must 
publicly denounce bootlegging in order to strengthen the 
 
 93.  COASTAL RES. CTR., supra note 64, at 178. 
 94.  Elliot Norse, Regional Governance and Ecosystem-Based Management 
of Ocean and Coastal Resources: Can We Get There From Here?, 16 DUKE 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 179, 180 (2006). 
 95.  SPECIAL AREA MANAGEMENT PLAN, supra note 87, at ch.11, p. 6.  
 96.  DAVID C. SLADE, PUTTING THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO WORK: THE 
APPLICATION OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO THE MANAGEMENT OF LANDS, 
WATERS AND LIVING RESOURCES OF COASTAL STATES 245–62 (1990). 
 97.   R.I. ADMIN. CODE 16-1-17:900 (West, Westlaw through Feb. 2017 
amendments). 
500 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 22:482 
interaction between the fishery and coastal sectors.  It can do this 
by including its management in its current programs and 
increasing the fines and penalties on the bootleggers because it is 
more appropriate they bear the cost of the loss they caused.  The 
implementation of a state regulation, outside the Ocean SAMP, 
requiring EBM considerations for ocean and coastal resources and 
recognizing the interdependence between fishery populations, 
habitat, and coastal health would greatly improve accountability.98  
While Rhode Island zealously embraces aquaculture, the public 
trust has a comprehensive CMP and openly embraces activities of 
this kind.  However, its implementation is extremely limited; the 
“one exception” to the state’s attractive nuisance approach, the 
RWU OGRE project, was canceled in January 2016, and no other 
restoration activity that mirrors the minimally invasive procedures 
discussed here has occurred in state waters.  Further, no case law 
exists on the direct issue.  Rhode Island’s constitutional recognition 
of such rights is not self-executing—it must be made effective by 
legislation.99  A legally binding distinction needs to be carved out 
for less-invasive aquaculture procedures that in the short term may 
impair the public’s enjoyment of the oyster fishery, but in the long 
term has a direct positive impact on the environment and provides 
a public benefit.100  A law of this kind, declaring an overriding 
public interest, catered to enhancing public resources over private 
industry, would encourage these kinds of practices.  Such a law 
could create an entity or vest the duty in a pre-existing agency to 
design and implement an adaptive approach that builds upon 
Rhode Island’s current laws to advance activities that affect coastal 
ecosystems in order to ensure the coexistence of healthy ecosystems 
and human activities.  Such a group could also be specifically tasked 
with creating routine reports to the governor and legislature that 
define needed legislative and executive actions and funding needs.  
In addition to appropriate regulations, Rhode Island could create a 
separate permitting system for projects of this kind that, instead of 
 
 98.   See, e.g., N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 14-0103 (West, Westlaw 
through L.2017) (declaring that the policy of the state “shall be to conserve, 
maintain and restore coastal ecosystems so that they are healthy, productive 
and resilient and able to deliver the resources people want and need”). 
 99.   See State v. Cozzens, 2 R.I. 561 (1850) (construing Art. I, § 17 of the 
Rhode Island Constitution). 
 100.   See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113–202 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. 
Sess.). 
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having minimal negative impacts on the environment, make 
positive improvements.  A separate permitting procedure would 
expedite the time spent in the permitting process and allow projects 
of this kind to better utilize their resources. 
Coastal management could be improved by strengthening 
governance through required coordination of the fishery and coastal 
sectors, increasing public participation, and overseeing resource 
expenditures.  To address this problem, the state legislature could 
enact a law that tasked a single agency, or required coordination 
and cooperation between the DEM and CRMC, with the obligation 
of preparing a plan for establishing an integrated system for 
improving closed-to-harvest protected areas and improving their 
management.101  By creating an agency whose purpose is to 
encourage cooperation between the fishery and coastal sectors, 
management will be centralized, and less energy will be lost trying 
to effectuate individual interests when both have a shared stake in 
the outcome.  As noted earlier, Roger Williams University recently 
canceled its RWU-OGRE program for lack of funding.102  The 
program relied on the University and private grants for its 
continuation—it did not receive state or federal funding.103  Rhode 
Island should prioritize programs like the RWU-OGRE program 
not just because of its coastal and fishery implications, but because 
the community engagement helps to boost support for the cause and 
volunteers help draw out resources.  To alleviate the problem, 
Governor Gina Raimondo could do what Washington’s Governor did 
when it created the Puget Sound Partnership—she could issue an 
executive order to develop recommendations for permanent 
partnerships of this kind—either to save the RWU-OGRE program 
or something similar. Rhode Island's leadership need not wait for 
another emergency like the 1966 North Cape Oil spill to carve out 
a second exception to the attractive nuisance approach given that 
the science and legal authority already exists. Though the Ocean 
State's coastal and shellfish management plans are exemplary in 
many respects, its implementation of restoration that impacts both 
sectors lags far behind other leading coastal states.  A stronger 
movement towards a healthier coast could be catalyzed by state 
 
 101.   See, e.g., CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 2855 (West, Westlaw through 2017 
Reg. Sess.). 
 102.   Interview with Dale Leavitt, supra note 67. 
 103.  Coelho, supra note 42.  
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leadership drawing attention to the issue.  Money may be less of an 
issue, if the large number of coastal property owners were made 
aware of what they are up against and what support they could give 
to curb the issue. The amalgamation of laws that exist may deceive 
those not trained in law to believe that progress is being made.  
Efforts by leaders like Governor Raimondo is essential to correct 
the mistaken belief that progress is being made because laws exist 
and to close the knowledge gap between coastal and fisheries 
management and the rest of society.104 
Coastal management could be improved if state policies 
included measurable indicators to more effectively attain its well 
established goals and objectives.  To improve, the Ocean SAMP 
could provide specific methods for how to achieve these goals and 
detail them within.105  The approach could be improved by creating 
measurable indicators that would evolve from the traditional single 
species, or specific delineated plot, to an EBM approach.106  The 
program should revise its implementation goals in order to account 
for its limited resources—oysters and locations closed-to-harvest.  
Taking realistic targets of what can be done with this, and taking 
into consideration the historic and existing programs’ funding, the 
program should create a coastal wide measure that supports all 
topic areas, reflecting achievable objectives given the programs 
current resource and initiatives.  It is my hope then that, instead of 
prioritizing activities in waters healthy enough to grow food, 
polluted waters will receive help as well.  Multi-species 
management would include those species that rely on oysters for 
habitat.  This species management could also include water quality 
indicators or water quality indicators could be a separate measure.  
Management may also be improved if the risk of bootlegging is 
assessed against the status of local fishery, current water quality 
levels, and other local indicators.  Rhode Island's wild oyster fishery 
 
 104.   See What is Action Agenda?, PUGET SOUND PARTNERSHIP, 
http://www.psp.wa.gov/action-agenda-what.php (last visited Mar. 24, 2017). 
 105.   See, e.g., CHESAPEAKE BAY PROGRAM, CHESAPEAKE BAY HEALTH & 
RESTORATION ASSESSMENT: A REPORT TO THE CITIZENS OF THE BAY REGION 
(2007), http://www.chesapeakebay.net/content/publications/cbp_26038.pdf 
(The program’s goal was to “develop, promote, and achieve sound land use 
practices which protect and restore watershed resources and water quality . . . 
and restore and preserve aquatic resources.”). 
 106.  See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CHESAPEAKE BAY PROGRAM OFFICE: 
STRENGTHENING THE MANAGEMENT, COORDINATION, AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF 
THE CHESAPEAKE BAY PROGRAM ii–iii (2008). 
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is nearly dead and thus its justification for applying the attractive 
nuisance approach is weaker than those coastal states with 
thriving wild fisheries and heavy involvement in interstate 
commerce. 
Substantively, Rhode Island’s Ocean SAMP is limited because 
it does not address all living marine resources based on 
maintaining the health of the ecosystem.  While the Ocean SAMP 
recognizes and promotes EBM, it needs to go a step further by 
explicitly recognizing significant species vital to a sustainable 
coast.  This would require the CRMC to designate species as being 
exploitable or protected.  As applied to the issue presented in this 
Comment, the oyster should be acknowledged and should receive 
heightened protection.  By explicitly acknowledging the importance 
of the oyster and the ecosystem services it provides, the CRMC 
would better position itself to combat the bootlegging faux pas. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Coastal states are at a crossroads between competing uses of 
the coastal zone.  States need to take full advantage of their CZMA 
authority to more efficiently restore their coastal zones.  A coastal 
state would first accomplish this by incorporating EBM into its 
approach and by making its CMP as comprehensive as possible.  
Second, a coastal state should enact state regulations that 
recognize and reinforce EBM as well as incentives and practices 
that pursue its coastal zone’s most polluted waters.  Once EBM is 
embedded in its laws, a coastal state may more effectively enforce 
its policies through an aggressive implementation of its CZMA 
authority.  While the use of the state’s powers in such style may 
cause some short-term economic and political disruption, the 
feasible results that likely will be achieved outweigh such negative 
results in the long run.  But as fisheries continue to be exploited, as 
the oyster in Rhode Island illustrates, and coastal areas remain 
degraded and largely untouched, there does not seem to be a choice. 
Armed with the CZMA authority and state regulations that 
add some teeth, coastal states have the scientific, congressional, 
and stakeholder support to implement a new coastal restoration 
policy that will change the way in which activities are conducted in 
the coastal zone.  Rhode Island is in the best position to continue to 
lead the coastal states in efficiently managing its coastal zone 
through the aggressive implementation of its CZMA authority 
because of its limited size and because it already incorporates EBM 
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in its Ocean SAMP.  While the proposals made in this Comment are 
not particularly novel, successful implementation of them would be.  
The exercise of state powers in this manner should overcome a court 
challenge because such actions are the product of states acting 
pursuant to their duty as a trustee to ensure the sustainability of 
their coastal resources. 
To summarize, Rhode Island and other coastal states have 
little to lose and much to gain by aggressively implementing their 
CZMA authority.  As the threat climate change poses becomes more 
of a reality, I urge Rhode Island to consider implementing the 
proposals made in this Comment as soon as possible.  The longer 
we wait the less we can revive, and the more it will cost at a later  
date. 
